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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a destitute, lower-class laborer in Brazil.1 As you are hard
at work one day, a foreign man whom you have never seen before asks if you will
sell one of your kidneys for an American woman dying of kidney failure. He offers
you a sum of $25,000, and he assures you that all your travel and medical expenses
will be covered.2 Moved by the chance to help save a stranger’s life and by the good
fortune to make some quick (and much-needed) money, you excitedly agree to be
flown to a hospital in South Africa to undergo the transplant procedure. But matters
quickly sour. You receive only $6,000 of the promised sum, and when you return
home, you find criminal charges filed against you for participation in an illegal organ
trade. To make matters worse, you have begun developing health complications
from the hurried procedure.3
Now picture yourself as a female college student at an Ivy League institution in
the United States.4 One day as you are leafing through the school newspaper, an

1
Larry Rohter, The Organ Trade: A Global Black Market; Tracking the Sale of a Kidney
on a Path of Poverty and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at 1. The following relates the
true story of Alberty Jose da Silva, a 38-year old Brazilian who has been implicated in a
worldwide black market organ trade.
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

This story derives from a particularly attractive advertisement in a 1999 college
newspaper. The ad reads as follows: “Help our dream come true…couple seeking egg donor.
Candidates should be intelligent, athletic, blonde, at least 5’10”, have a 1400+ SAT score, and
possess no major family medical issues. $50,000.” SoYouWanna.com, So You Wanna
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advertisement catches your eye: “$50,000 guaranteed for eggs. Must have blonde
hair and blue eyes, have minimum SAT score of 1450, be no shorter than 5’6”, be of
attractive physique, and be in overall good health.” Judging yourself compatible
with these requirements, you follow up on the ad and begin the procedure to donate
your eggs. However, the experience does not quite live up to the advertisement. Not
only do you endure an extremely invasive procedure, including having to take
hormone-stimulating drugs that possibly present unknown risks to your health, but
you also receive much less than the promised $50,000.5
Although these two situations at first glance appear worlds apart, the dilemmas
suffered by their protagonists derive from a common source: federal, state and
international statutory prohibitions on organ sales. In the United States and many
countries throughout the world, selling non-regenerative organs for monetary gain
constitutes a serious criminal offense.6 Notwithstanding this strong ban on the sale
of organs, United States citizens are permitted to sell other “parts” of their bodies,
including blood, sperm, and eggs (“ova”), for market value because current statutes
do not consider reproductive cells and other regenerative tissue “organs” or even
within the ambit of “parts.”7 Rather, in most contexts, regenerative cells and tissue
are thought of as “products” of the human body. In fact, the United States remains
one of only a few industrialized nations that allow the sale of human reproductive
cells (“gametes”).8
Given the similarities between the unfortunate stories above, however, such a
“Products vs. Organs” distinction is no longer tenable in this age of rapidlydeveloping medical research. The incongruous management of alienation of human
body parts needs to be reconciled with traditional principles of property law. This
note seeks to bring the legal status of gametes into line with that of organs using the
framework of property rights. This note will argue that, since the law justifiably
prohibits people from selling organs, it should likewise bar them from selling any
Donate an Egg?, http://www.soyouwanna.com/site/syws/donateegg/donateeggFULL.html
(last visited Nov. 27, 2004).
I challenge readers of this note to consult their local city or college newspaper, as they will
find advertisements quite similar to this one.
5
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG
DONOR? GET THE FACTS BEFORE YOU DECIDE! 7 [hereinafter “GET THE FACTS”] (Oct. 2002), at
http://www.health.state.ny.us/nyudoh/infertility/pdf/1127.pdf.
6

National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2004).

7

“Human organ[s]” include the following under § 274e: human (including fetal) kidneys,
liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin “or any subpart thereof.”
42 U.S.C. § 274e.
8

The United Kingdom and France make illegal the outright sale of reproductive cells.
David B. Resnik, Eggs for Sale, 3 J. MED. ETHICS 1 (2000),
http://www.ecu.edu/medhum/newsletter/ spring2000_p1.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
Also, Canada has banned sales of human eggs and sperm. Michelle Blackley, Eggs For
Sale: The Latest Controversy in Reproductive Technology: Couples Are Paying Lofty Fees to
Egg Donors With the Perfect Combination of Brains and Beauty, USA TODAY MAGAZINE
(July 2003), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_2698_132/ai_
104971305 (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
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parts of their bodies - even the products thereof (specifically sperm and ova) - as
disposable personal property. This note will conclude with the proposition that a
system of total market-inalienability and uncompensated donation of human body
parts will best fulfill the economic goal of supplying organs and gametes to those in
need of them while simultaneously protecting donors from any coercion of sale.
Part II of this note will begin by surveying the philosophical and doctrinal
underpinnings of property law as they relate to human beings and their bodies and
will continue with an exploration of the impact, both theoretical and actual, of
commodification on market behavior. Then, through case study at both the federal
and state levels, Part II will assess the historical judicial hesitance against
recognizing any outright property interests in the human body or its components.
Part III will describe the current state of the law prohibiting market sales of human
organs and factual data regarding organ donations. It will then move to a discussion
of contemporary policies for and against the sale of “non-regenerative” organs.
Part IV will explain why sales of gametes are contrastingly permitted in the
United States and will position arguments supporting the sale and purchase of sperm
and ova as distinguishable from organs. Finally, Part V will compare and analyze
the preceding arguments and will argue that the statutory prohibition on monetary
compensation for organs should extend uniformly to gametes. This paper will
conclude with the proposition that the law should authorize only profit-less donations
of either organs or gametes and only allow reimbursement costs to donors for
expenses incident to the donation procedures.
II. HISTORICO-LEGAL TREATMENT OF THE HUMAN BODY
A. Doctrinal and Philosophical Theories
on “Propertization” of the Human Body
In order to determine whether any property right in the human body exists,
property itself should first attain a satisfactory definition. However, this task proves
to be quite difficult, if not practically impossible, since property has always been an
abstract concept at best.9 Contrary to the common tendency to define property with
respect to physical objects, property actually refers to “rights or relationships among
people with respect to [those objects].”10 And so, most property theorists envision
property as a “bundle of rights” – a commingled group of separate rights gained
when one acquires property.11 Classically, these include the right to use property, the
right to exclude others from using one’s property, and the right to transfer or
“alienate” property.12 Regardless of whatever definition of property one uses
however, property, as a societal vehicle in attributing wealth, must have its basis in
some broader justifying theory.13
9

JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY, 93 (4th ed. 2002).

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.3d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra
note 9, at 93.
13

Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Property: Toward a Property Right in Human
Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1990).
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Indeed, several theories were advanced to justify property rights. To begin with,
John Locke espoused a theory of property grounded in principles of natural law.14 In
regard to human beings and property, Locke stated that all people by nature have a
property interest in their own “person.”15 This right derived from one of Locke’s
central theses: people could own things external to themselves only because they
first have ownership in their own bodies.16
Similarly, Georg Frederic Hegel postulated that ownership of one’s body
necessarily precedes ownership of any external things.17 However, Hegel diverged
from Locke when maintaining that no absolute property rights in one’s body could
exist;18 rather, human beings decide when and how they wish to relinquish their
rights to “the members of [their] bod[ies].”19 Thus, Hegel took Locke’s natural
rights theory and added the element of human choice into the calculus of defining
property rights.
However, a second property theory stands diametrically opposed to natural rights
theory: utilitarianism. With Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill as its primary
advocates, utilitarianism generally holds that property rights exist only because
human behavior and laws create and grant them.20 For Mill, the ideal notion of
property contained the rights to things that human beings produce by their own
labor.21 Accordingly, Mill reasoned that no property right in the human body could
exist, since the body is not a product of human labor.22 Furthermore, Mill lamented
that the law “ha[s] made property of things which never ought to be property, and
absolute property where only a qualified property ought to exist.”23 Thus, while
early natural rights theorists assumed and almost took for granted that property right
exists in the human body, utilitarians contrarily denied that people have this right.
With this divergent quandary in mind and in order to strike a balance between
these two competing theories, in 1987 law professor Margaret Jane Radin, proposed
her “personhood model” for property rights in a highly influential law review
article.24 Developing her model under the auspices of Kant and Hegel, Professor
Radin promoted that the closer something is to the human identity and self, the less
accurately it can be considered property.25 In other words, those aspects, attributes,
and qualities of the human person – those that are so qualitatively vital to the concept
14

See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT § 27 (3d ed. 1968).

15

Id.

16

Bray, supra note 13, at 212.

17

Id. at 213. GEORG HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 44 (T. Knox trans. 1967).

18

Bray, supra note 13, at 213.

19

HEGEL, supra note 17, at § 47.

20

JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, bk. I, 123-25 (1904).

21

Id. at 133.

22

Bray, supra note 13, at 213.

23

MILL, supra note 20, bk. III, at 208.

24

Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).

25

Id. at 1907.
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of human identity, those that are quintessentially “human” – should never receive
property status. Although Radin did not directly address the issue of whether the
human body is property under this “personhood” paradigm, she appreciated that all
body parts could be esteemed as so “integral to the [human] self” that they are
essentially distinct from vulgar, fungible market commodities.26
Crucial to Radin’s thesis is the notion of separability: “[t]o conceive of
something personal as fungible assumes that the person and the attribute, right, or
thing, are separate.”27 In regard to human bodies and parts, separability translates
like this: conceiving of a human organ, which likely would be deemed as truly
personal to human self and identity, as “monetizable or completely detachable from
the person . . . is to do violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be
human.”28 For Radin, not unlike Mill in this respect, separability of the human
person from the body portends the very real danger of viewing all other people as
objects, attainable and ownable as personal property.
Radin’s personhood analysis further developed the concept of separability within
the context of a fundamental right in the “bundle” of property rights: alienability.
Following Hegel, she defined alienation plainly as “the separation of something . . .
from its holder.”29 Applying that model to the human person, she argued that only
those things inherently separate from the human self can be alienated from it.30
Just as the Declaration of Independence professes its list of “inalienable rights,”31
certain rights are indeed inherently inalienable.32 While American property rights
generally enjoy a presumption of full alienability, certain “exceptional” property
rights are denied this status completely.33 As Radin suggests, total inalienability
yields many nuances in meaning, in some instances denoting not subject to transfer
or not subject to commercial sale, while in others carrying the connotation of rights
not relinquishable, waivable or perishable at the hand of their holders.34 For the
purposes of this note, “inalienability” refers to that category of property not subject
to commercial sale - that certain things are of such nature that they can never be
transferred by contract for sale in exchange for valuable consideration.35 Radin
terms this species of non-salability “market-inalienability.”36
26
Id. at 1906. Examples of “everyday” fungible commodities may include automobiles,
baseball cards, steak dinners, currency, and deeds to parcels of land.
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 1852.

30

Id.

31

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

32

Radin, supra note 24, at 1849.

33

Id. at 1850.

34

Id. at 1849-50.

35

See id. at 1850; Radin’s extreme example for a “non-salable” is that of a “market in
infants”; see also Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 23
(1978).
36

Radin, supra note 24, at 1850.
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Nevertheless, Professor Radin was careful to assure that non-salability does not
mandate per se prohibitions on donative transfers as well.37 Gifts of marketinalienable objects are always permissible in such a regime, according to Radin,
because “[n]on-giveability” (the prohibition against donative transfers) occupies a
separate sphere of inalienability from non-salability;38 that is, they are, visually
speaking, two circles that overlap in certain situations but do not overlap in others.
And so, Radin explicated an essential aspect of market-inalienability when stating
that, while property classified as market-inalienable cannot be transferred by contract
for sale, it may be transferred by gift.39
Still, the genius of Radin’s market-inalienability model did not fully shine
through until she further applied it to the concept of commodification.40 Generally, a
“commodity” is any article of trade or commerce for sale in a particular market.41 In
the simplest sense, commodification describes legally permitting the buying and
selling of some thing.42 For Radin, however, commodification of the human body
poses an even greater danger than simply buying and selling on the market. For in
another, broader sense, commodification not only means actual salability on the
market but also includes general “market rhetoric, the practice of thinking about
interactions as if they were sale transactions.”43 In other words, commodification
represents the subconscious categorizing of something as a market good. Radin
argues that, once this first step of commodification occurs, that is, “once market
value enters our discourse” in regards to a certain object in the primary instance of
sale, a slippery slope will result, and “market rhetoric will take over and characterize
every [future] interaction in terms of market value.”44
When the concept of commodification is applied to the human body, treating it as
an article of commerce in a few preliminary transactions (sales of organs, for
example) would eventually lead to the human body itself being thought of as a
fungible commodity.45 More specifically, once the first legally-sanctioned barter of
a human kidney commences, it will be only a matter of time before all kidneys will
be considered and sought after as market commodities.
And so, applying market-inalienability to the concept of commodification, Radin
argued that “[b]y making something nonsalable we proclaim that it should not be
conceived of or treated as a commodity.”46 As a result, Radin advocated a
prophylactic rule against outright sale of children, sexual services, physical
37

Id. at 1854-55.

38

Id. at 1853.

39

Id. at 1854-55.

40

Id. at 1855.

41

“The term embraces only tangible goods, such as products or merchandise . . . .”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
42

Radin, supra note 24, at 1859.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 1914.

45

Id. at 1907.

46

Id. at 1855.

2003-04]

NO VALUE FOR A POUND OF FLESH

205

characteristics, and body parts because “such commodification [would be]
destructive of personhood . . . .”47 Thus, Radin completed her model of personhood
theory of property by declaring that all rights, attributes, and things intrinsically
unique to the human person must not be commodified.48 The appropriate means to
accomplish this goal of non-commodification of the human body lies in deeming it
and its composite parts market-inalienable.
Although philosophers and theorists have disagreed on whether or not the body is
property, Professor Radin’s personhood model of property rights strikes a delicate
and appropriate balance. Even if it could be said that people have property rights in
their own bodies, those rights still must be carefully limited. One necessary and
proper limit, as Radin suggests, is to deem the human body and its parts marketinalienable.49 This vision of non-salability best preserves the utmost dignity and
respect for the human vessel by not allowing a price tag to be affixed to it while at
the same time permitting free donation for much-needed human organs, tissue, and
cells.
B. Case History of the Human Body and its Parts as “Quasi” Property
Historically, American law has been consistently averse to allowing people to
treat their body parts like normal parcels of personal property.50 This fact may
arouse curiosity and concern, since the Declaration of Independence affirms the right
to the pursuit of happiness and the concomitant right to own property to be
“inalienable.”51 However, the Framers’ intent was likely not to include a property
right in one’s body as one of those constitutionally protected rights.52
Following English common law, courts in the United States initially refused to
recognize any property interest in a human corpse, particularly for purposes of
burial.53 Despite this early reluctance, several 19th century state courts labored to
grant plaintiffs recovery for the right to bury their next of kin.54 For instance, in
1890, the Indiana Supreme Court allowed a father and mother to recover in tort for
the negligent disposal of their deceased daughter’s body.55 Although positioning its

47

Id. at 1910.

48

Id. at 1907.

49

Id. at 1903.

50

Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 29 (Oct. 1986).

51

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

52

Bray, supra note 13, at 218.

53

ALEXANDER M. CAPRON & IRWIN M. BIRNBAUM, 5-23 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW §
21.02, at 2 (24th ed. 2004); see also Renihan v. Wright, 25 N.E. 822, 824 (Ind. 1890)
(surveying the refusal of English common law courts to hear actions for the “disturbance of
the remains of . . . buried ancestors”).
54

O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906 (Cal. 1899); Renihan, 25 N.E. at 824.

55

Renihan, 25 N.E. at 823 (stating in the facts that undertakers refused to provide the
location of the daughter’s body except with the trite explanation “[y]our child is in Ohio”).
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holding on evanescent “burial rights,” the Indiana court reasoned that a dead body
belongs to the surviving relatives as “other property.”56
This nebulous notion of “other” property received a more perfect definition as
“quasi-property” in a California case several years later.57 In O’Donnell v. Slack,58
the California Supreme Court held that a quasi-property right to a decedent’s body
vests in the next of kin.59 Specifically, the decedent O’Donnell had expressed his
last wish to his widow that he be buried beside his parents’ remains in Ireland, which
wish the widow did not follow.60 While the California court expressly held that the
human body itself is not personal property disposable by probate, it recognized some
species of legal ownership by the next of kin in a deceased relative’s body.61
More recently, courts have acknowledged the rights of next of kin to recover for
civil deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.62 This federal statute allows
recovery for deprivation of property under color of state statute without due process
of law.63 Several cases implicated coroners who had removed the decedents’ corneas
without obtaining consent from the next of kin.64 The coroners in each situation
claimed to have acted pursuant to state statutes that purported to allow the removal
of corneas “provided that the coroner has no knowledge of an objection by the
decedent, the decedent’s spouse, or . . . the next of kin . . . .”65 The relatives of the
deceased subsequently brought suit, alleging that their legal rights in the decedents’
bodies had been violated by the coroners’ actions. Recall, however, that in the
United States, a human corpse is not the personal property either of the next of kin or
56

Id. at 825.

57

O’Donnell, 55 P. at 907.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 906.

61

Id. at 907.

62

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”
63

Id.

64

Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1029
(2002); Whaley v. Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1113 (6th Cir. 1995); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923
F.2d 477, 478 (6th Cir. 1991).
65

Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 478 (paraphrasing OHIO REV. CODE § 2108.60); see also Whaley,
58 F.3d at 1116 (equating Michigan’s Anatomical Gift law with Ohio’s); Newman, 287 F.3d
788 (citing CAL. GOV. CODE § 27491.47(a): “the coroner may, in the course of the autopsy,
remove . . . corneal eye tissue . . . if . . . the coroner has no knowledge of objection to the
removal . . .). Note that the Ohio and California statutes involved are codifications of the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.
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of the state.66 With each plaintiff having successfully recovered damages, the federal
circuit courts remarkably surmounted the legal obstacle of the “deprivation of
property” element necessary in a § 1983 action.67
In Brotherton v. Cleveland,68 the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the concept of
property escapes exact legal definition because it is often conceptualized as a
“bundle of rights.”69 And so, that court held that the aggregate of these rights
combine to form a “substantial interest” in the dead body, regardless of whatever
title this combination of rights may be given.70 In dissent, Justice Joiner reminded
the court of the steadfast refusal under Ohio law to recognize any property right in a
deceased human body.71 Justice Joiner was troubled at the court’s virtual “creat[ion
of] a property right” in a dead body by allowing a plaintiff to recover for deprivation
of property under § 1983.72
Even before Justice Joiner voiced his dissent in Brotherton, the Florida Supreme
Court had upheld as constitutional a statute allowing medical examiners to remove
corneal tissue from decedents for necessary transplantations.73 In an opinion
predicting Joiner’s concerns about granting property status to human bodies, the
court in Florida v. Powell held that no full property right to a deceased relative’s
body vests in the next of kin, but rather a right strictly “limited to ‘possession of the
body . . . for the purpose of burial, sepulture or other lawful disposition.’”74
Cautioning that any cognizable right to a human body must be limited to that sole
purpose of proper burial, the court proclaimed the inherent difficulty in
distinguishing the human body from the traditional legal framework of property
law75 and fashioned its decision on the strictly delimited right to bury the decedent.76
Four years after Brotherton, in Whaley v. Tuscola,77 the Sixth Circuit again
declared that the aggregation of the rights to a decedent’s body should allow the next

66

POLLY J. PRICE, PROPERTY RIGHTS: RIGHTS & LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW, 158 (ABCCLIO 2003).
67

Three elements are necessary to establish a violation of due process under § 1983: (1)
deprivation, (2) of property, (3) under color of state law. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 479
(emphasis added).
68

Id.

69

Id. at 481.

70

Id. at 482.

71

Id. at 483.

72

Id.

73

Florida v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188, 1194 (Fla. 1986).

74

Id. at 1191 (citing Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950)).

75

“It seems reasonably obvious that such ‘property’ is something evolved out of thin air to
meet the occasion, and that it is in reality the personal feelings of the survivors which are
being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.” Id. at 1192 (citing W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 43-4 (2d ed. 1955)).
76

Powell, 497 So.2d at 1192.

77

Whaley, 58 F.3d 1111, 1115.
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of kin to recover for any violation of those rights.78 The Sixth Circuit found that the
distinctive rights to dispose of a human body, to make a gift of its parts, to prevent its
expropriation by others, and to possess it for burial quantitatively add up to “the
heart and soul of the common law understanding of ‘property.’”79 In an even
stronger opinion than what it had issued in Brotherton, the Sixth Circuit “look[ed]
beyond the law’s nomenclature and to its substance” and used a generously
malleable definition of property to allow the plaintiff to recover.80 Thus, although
still hesitant to state explicitly the existence of an outright property right to a human
body, federal courts began to allow recovery on the basis of a combination of “other”
rights.81
Following the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit in Newman v.
Sathyavaglswaran82 held that the identification of constitutional property interests
“turns on the substance of the interest recognized, not the name given that interest.”83
Following the quasi-property rationale of earlier decisions, the Newman court held
that the coroners had “chopped through the bundle [of property rights of the
decedents’ next of kin], taking a slice of every strand” by removing the decedents’
corneas without prior consent.84 Newman instructs that, since the human body and
its parts enjoy at best only a “quasi-property” status, state actions grounded in
common law torts such as conversion or replevin will likely be untenable.85 Thus,
ostensibly due to the flexible nature of the rights upon which plaintiffs sue under §
1983, federal actions have been contrastingly more successful than actions based on
state common law.
Nevertheless, it would be unfounded to maintain that questions have not arisen
on the state level regarding the property status of human body parts. Perhaps the
most intriguing case is Venner v. Maryland,86 addressing whether human excrement
could be the property of its owner. Venner involved the determination that an
unreasonable search and seizure of criminal defendant Charles Venner’s feces did
not occur during a narcotics investigation.87 The defendant had ingested twenty-one
78

Id.

79

Id.

80

“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law – rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. at 1114 (citing Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).
81

“Just because the woman cannot technically ‘replevin’ her husband’s body does not
mean she has no legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Whaley, 58 F.3d at 1116.
82

Newman, 287 F.3d 786, 797.

83

Id.

84

Id. at 798.

85

“All authorities generally agree that the next of kin have no property right in the remains
of a decedent.” Powell, 497 So.2d at 1191.
86

Venner v. Maryland, 354 A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).

87

Id.
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balloons filled with hashish oil in a daring attempt to smuggle the illegal substance
across state lines.88 With Venner suddenly hospitalized due to a resultant drug
overdose after one balloon “fortuitous[ly]” exploded in his stomach, police seized his
leavings to obtain the balloons as evidence.89 Before his trial, Venner motioned to
suppress the balloons from evidence, claiming that they had been obtained in a
warrantless search and seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.90
Most intriguing is the general holding of Venner that human waste could possibly
be considered property; the Venner court held that human waste “or other materials
which were once a part of or contained within [the] body” are subject to property
rights and that any person may assert rights over excrement.91 Thus, since Venner
did not assert such dominion and control over his feces or the balloons
accompanying, he had legally abandoned his property, or more specifically
“whatever legal right he theretofore had” in it.92 The Venner court was certainly not
as wary as the federal Circuit Courts about referring to the body as property, but it
still vacillated concerning the nature of the legal rights Venner had in his waste.
Furthermore, using the doctrinal basis from cases involving the disposition of
dead bodies, another state court, speaking explicitly of gametes as the personal
property of their owners, extended the quasi-property analysis to the bequest of
human sperm.93 In Hecht v. Superior Court,94 the decedent William H. Kane had
attempted to bequeath by his last will and testament his sperm that he had deposited
at a Los Angeles sperm bank.95 Kane’s will read, in pertinent part: “I bequeath all
right, title, and interest that I may have in any specimens of my sperm stored with
any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to Deborah Ellen Hecht.”96 In a
tremendous leap, the Hecht court, expressly stating that the decedent had a property
interest in accordance with the California Probate Code’s definition of property,97
held that the decedent could probate his sperm cells. Stating that Kane had an
undeniable interest in the disposition of his frozen sperm cells, the court explained
that “even if not governed by the general law of personal property, [they would still]
occup[y] ‘an interim category’” of ownership and legal protection.98 Thus, although

88

Id. at 486.
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Id. at 489-90.

90

Id. at 486.
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Id. at 498.
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Id. at 499.
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Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
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Id.

95

Id. at 276.

96

Id. Kane also had a contract with the sperm bank which provided for similar disposition
to Deborah.
97
Defined as “anything that may be the subject of ownership and includes both real and
personal property and any interest therein.” CAL. PROBATE CODE § 62 (West 2002).
98

Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn.
1992)).
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state courts have remained consistently hostile to recognizing any traditional
property interest in a human body or a part thereof, Hecht teased out of the prior law
a narrow comprehension of property rights in human cells.99
Despite this longstanding debate regarding legal rights over one’s body parts, no
case, state or federal, has had more of an impact on the issue of property rights in the
human body than the California Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Regents of
University of California.100 Moore’s legal vigor and import stems not as much from
what the Supreme Court of California said in its landmark decision, but rather in
what it failed to say.
In Moore, the plaintiff had undergone several treatments for hairy-cell leukemia
at UCLA Medical Center as well as numerous and extensive extractions of “blood,
bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily substances.”101 Unbeknownst to Moore, his
physician, Dr. Golde, was conducting extensive research on Moore’s very rare cells
with the motive of developing and patenting a new commercial cell line derived from
them.102 Moore subsequently sued the medical center and Dr. Golde for breach of
fiduciary duty, lack of informed consent, and, most importantly, conversion.103
The California Court of Appeals in Moore, by allowing Moore to recover on his
conversion theory, recognized a complete property right in the human body.104
However, in reversing that decision, the California Supreme Court avoided the issue
of whether Moore’s cells were his property, holding only that Moore’s conversion
theory must fail because he neither had title to nor possession of his cells after they
had been removed from his body and altered by Dr. Golde to the new cell line.105
The Moore court found no judicial precedent supporting Moore’s claim of
conversion and also declared that the subject of the Regents’ patent – the invention
of a qualitatively different and novel cell line – could no longer be viewed as
Moore’s property.106 As the California Supreme Court did not address the appellate
court’s competence of a full property right, the only guidance given by Moore on
whether the human body is property lies in its statement that the law treats human
tissues, organs, blood, and dead bodies as objects sui generis – physical objects not
within the parameters of traditional personal property.107

99

Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849.

100

Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479 (1990).

101

Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 125.

102

Id. at 126.

103

Id. at 124.

104

Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 728-29 (1988), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479 (1990). Conversion is “a tort that protects against
interference with possessory and ownership interests in personal property.” Moore, 51 Cal. 3d
at 134.
105
“Where plaintiff neither has title to the property alleged to have been converted, nor
possession thereof, he cannot maintain an action for conversion.” Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 136
(citing Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 610-11 (1981)).
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Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 137.
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In a concurring opinion in Moore, Justice Arabian voiced the moral rationale for
rejecting Moore’s claim for conversion of his cells.108 Arabian articulated the
problem of commodification of human body parts – “the selling of one’s own body
tissue for profit” – as an inclement degradation of “the human vessel – the single
most venerated and protected subject in any civilized society.”109 Focusing on the
possible adverse effects on human dignity of any resultant “marketplace in human
body parts,” Arabian warned that courts should forbear from any pronouncement that
the human body or any part thereof is property.110 “Clearly the Legislature, as the
majority opinion suggests, is the proper deliberative forum” for any such
pronouncement.111
At this juncture, there may appear an irreconcilable legal disparity. While on the
one hand some courts have held that the human body and its parts are not property,
several courts, on the other hand, have openly declared human waste and cells to be
some kind of personal property of their “owner.” However, this disparity is likely
illusory and merely the result of confusing misuse of terminology throughout these
cases. As a Comment to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868112 illustrates, the
incongruity in judicial language regarding human bodies is simply a by-product of
the legal difficulty of pigeonholing the unique nature of the human body into
traditional property concepts.113 The Restatement authors recognized that courts,
whether interchangeably or by inconsistency, use the terms “property” and “quasiproperty” in reference to the rights that people or next of kin, respectively, have in
human bodies.114 The Comment argues that this mere technicality should be
disregarded, because the tort of interference with dead bodies is an action seeking
damages, not for violation of any property right, but rather for mental distress
suffered as a result of the tort.115
Consider also the following excerpt from Dougherty v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit
& Trust Co.,116 a case which “summarized” Maryland’s law on this issue117:

108

Id. at 148.

109

Id.

110

Id. at 149-50.

111

Id.

112

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1979). “One who intentionally, recklessly or
negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person or
prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family of
the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body.”
113
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 Cmt. a. “This does not, however, fit very well
into the category of property, since the body ordinarily cannot be sold or transferred, has no
utility, and can be used only for the one purpose of interment and cremation.”
114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Dougherty v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 387 A.2d 244, 246 (Md. Ct. App.

1978).
117

Powell, 497 So.2d at 1192.
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[i]t is universally recognized that there is no property in a dead body in a
commercial or material sense. It is not a part of the assets of the estate . . .
it is not subject to replevin; it is not property in a sense that will support
discovery proceedings; it may not be held as security for funeral costs; it
cannot be withheld by an express company, or returned to the sender,
where shipped under a contract calling for cash on delivery; it may not be
the subject of a gift causa mortis; it is not common law larceny to steal a
corpse.118
Taking Venner and Hecht along with this statement in Dougherty further illustrates
the tension even among state courts as to whether human beings have any legal
property rights in their bodies. Thus, on account of its mercurial legal status, the
human body presents unique issues for lower courts that have attempted to answer
whether it is property.
To date, the Supreme Court of the United States has not had the opportunity to
directly address the issue of whether people have any property rights, traditional or
sui generis, in their organs or tissue or in those of their next of kin upon death.119
Heeding Justice Arabian’s concerns in Moore, perhaps that is a comforting fact.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has decreed several times that the claim that “one
has an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases” is purely mistaken.120
For instance, Justice Harlan in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,121 in rejecting a due
process challenge to a state vaccination statute, iterated that the concept of liberty
“secured by the Constitution . . . to every person . . . does not import an absolute
right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from
restraint.122 More importantly, Harlan added the following limitation on the rights of
property: “[r]eal liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle
which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own . . . regardless of
the injury that may be done to others.”123
In addition, Justice Blackmun of the majority in Roe v. Wade124 stated that,
although the privacy right fashioned in that case may encompass a woman’s abortion
decision, “this right is not unqualified” and must yield to important interests of the
sovereign.125 Regardless, the Supreme Court has laid down no uniform judicial rule
of whether or not the human body and its parts are property. At best, lower
American courts have acknowledged an evasive “quasi-property” status.126

118
Dougherty, 387 A.2d at 246 (quoting P.E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF
BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES (2d ed. 1950)).
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PRICE, supra note 66, at 162.
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
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Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).

122

Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
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Id.
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Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
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III. CONTEMPORARY LAWS AND POLICIES
REGARDING SALES OF HUMAN ORGANS
The judicially-constructed quasi-property status of the human body may have
influenced the legislative enactment of the current prohibition on organ sales. Both
federal and state statutes forbid monetary compensation to the donor of any human
organ.127 On the federal level, the National Organ Transplant Act (hereinafter
“NOTA”), enacted in 1984, expressly prohibits any direct payment to donors of
human organs.128 Some sections of NOTA set up administrative guidelines for a
network of non-profit agencies to facilitate organ procurement and transplantation
procedures nationally; others arrange criteria for the national and local lists of
individuals in need of healthy organs, along with a coordinated system which
matches them with possible donors.129 NOTA narrowly defines “human organ” as
“the human . . . kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone,
and skin or any subpart thereof and any other human organ. . . .”130 State regulations
have similar definitions, with minimal nuances in wording.131 Furthermore, NOTA
renders illegal any payment to family members of deceased organ donors.132
Accordingly, NOTA and state statutes provide hefty penalties, including fines or
imprisonment, for violating their prohibitions on organ sales.133
In enacting NOTA, Congress intended to prevent for-profit marketing of human
organs.134 Interestingly, this legislation was rushed through Capitol Hill due to the
plans of a Virginia physician to arrange a commercial market in human kidneys.135
In 1983, Dr. H. Barry Jacobs proposed a federally subsidized network that would pay
for removal and transplant operations of organs to Medicare patients.136 The
proposition shocked many and was met with immediate congressional dissent,
127

National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (2003); see also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2108.12 (Anderson 2002); CAL. PENAL CODE § 367(f) (West 1999).
128

42 U.S.C. § 274e.

129

42 U.S.C. § 273.

130

42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1).

131

See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367(f) (defining “human organ” as “any other human
organ or nonrenewable or nonregenerative tissue except plasma and sperm”); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2108.01 (defining “tissue” negatively as “any body part other than an organ or eye”)
(emphasis added).
132

42 U.S.C. § 274e; see also Melissa Healy, The Changing Rules of Organ Donation;
Billboards, Websites and Financial Incentives Are Pushing the Ethical Boundaries, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at F1.
133

See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (imposing a maximum fine of $50,000 and/or a minimum
imprisonment term of five years for sale of any human organ “if it affects interstate
commerce”); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.99 (proscribing violation of organ sale
prohibition to be a felony of the fifth degree).
134

S. Rep. No. 98-382, at 4 (1984).
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Margaret Engel, Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys, WASH.
POST, Sep. 19, 1983, at A9.
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including then-Tennessee Senator Albert Gore, Jr., vehemently contended that
“[p]utting organs on a market basis is abhorrent to our system of values.”137 In its
report, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources (hereinafter “the
Committee”) succinctly advanced the government’s position: “[t]he Committee
believes that human body parts should not be viewed as commodities.”138 The
Committee envisioned these dangers to be on the horizon with medical
advancements of the early 1980s, and it saw the immediate need for federal
legislation barring the commercial sale of human organs.
Despite this prohibition on organ sale and purchase, a statute related to NOTA
actively encourages voluntary, uncompensated donation of human organs: the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (hereinafter “UAGA”).139 Since its two promulgations
in 1968 and 1987, the UAGA has disseminated statutory guidelines for the
enactment of state regulations to govern the procurement and transplantation of
human organs.140 In the vast majority of its text, the UAGA encourages the donation
of bodily organs for transplantation, so long as such donations are uncompensated.141
It expressly allows the donation of the human body or a part thereof either by the
decedent’s wishes or, in some instances, by those of next of kin of the deceased,
provided that no relative of the donor or any other third party receives monetary
profit.142 All fifty states have adopted versions of this Uniform Act into their state
legislative codes.143
Unlike NOTA, which attends to “live” donations,144 the UAGA focuses entirely
on donations of anatomical gifts at one’s death.145 It provides that an individual of at
least eighteen years of age may make an anatomical gift or may refuse to do so.146
The prefatory note to the UAGA, states the recognition of the quandary of property
law journeyed in Part II above:
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Id.
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S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 17 (emphasis added).
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Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 1, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1983 & Supp. 2004).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at § 10.
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CAPRON & BIRNBAUM, supra note 53, at 2. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. §§ 7150 to 7156.5 (West 1970 & Supp. 2005); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1501 to 2-1511
(2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.910 to 732.922 (West 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
17:2351 to 17:2359 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 4-501 to
4-512 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 113, §§ 7 to 14 (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
333.10101 to 333.10109 (West 2001); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4300 to 4308 (McKinney
2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2108.01 to 2108.10 (Anderson 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
157.06 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004).
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See generally 42 U.S.C. § 274.
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Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 1(1) (defining “anatomical gift” as “a donation of all or
part of a human body to take effect upon or after death”).
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Id. at § 2(a).
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if utilization of bodies and parts of bodies is to be effectuated, a
number of competing interests in a dead body must be harmonized, and
several troublesome legal questions must be answered . . . Both the
common law and the present statutory picture is one of confusion,
diversity, and inadequacy . . . .The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act . . .
carefully weighs the numerous conflicting interests and legal problems.
Wherever adopted it will encourage the making of anatomical gifts, thus
facilitating therapy involving such procedures . . . .147
In perhaps its only aspect similar to NOTA, the UAGA also makes illegal the sale or
purchase of organs from deceased human bodies for valuable consideration.148 Thus,
while NOTA bars inter vivos transfers of human organs by commercial sale, the
UAGA likewise prohibits their posthumous transfer by testamentary gift or intestate
succession if monetary compensation has been bargained for in exchange.
Supporters of the prohibition on organ sales offer many public policy rationales
that reflect the need to uphold the dignity and traditionally sacrosanct nature of the
human body. Before examining these policies, contemplate first a poignant
comment of Justice Flaherty of a Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court: “[f]orcible
extraction of living body tissues causes revulsion to the judicial mind. Such would
raise the spectre of the swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this
portends.”149 Commentators and legal ethicists similarly maintain that any eventual
financial market compensating donors for their body parts will harm the donors
themselves, the recipients, and ultimately society itself.150
In general, an ominous fear of commodification151 of the human body pervades
nearly all support for the prohibition on organ sales. Once again, commodification
describes both the actual sale of a thing as an article of commerce and the subliminal
envisioning of that thing in “market rhetoric” by the public.152 As Professor Radin’s
analysis reveals, compensation to organ donors has been widely attacked as
espousing the notion that people may become viewed as market commodities.153
The fear is that, should human body parts be granted full property rights, then, as one
expert put it, “we would become slaves, not in a market for our bodies, but in a
market for body parts.”154

147

Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
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Id. § 10(a).
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McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Common Pleas Ct. 1978) (denying a
preliminary injunction that sought to compel a matching donor to undergo a bone marrow
transplant).
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Second, many view the present system of organ procurement, embodied in the
United Network for Organ Sharing,155 as the only ethically permissible method in
striking the delicate balance between maximizing organ procurement (and in turn
saving as many lives as possible) and respecting the dignity of the human body.156
Under Professor Radin’s analysis of commodification, this argument would entail
that the free donation system for human organs would dissolve should commercial
sales be permitted.157 In hearings in the House of Representatives before NOTA was
passed, then-Senator Albert Gore affirmed that “[i]t is against our system of values
to buy and sell parts of human beings.”158 The core tenet of this argument holds that
it is simply unethical and inhumane to "put a price on a human life.”159
Third, supporters of the prohibition assert that lifting the ban would make the
poor “second-class citizens,” as they would be economically coerced into selling
their organs to the rich.160 One transplant surgeon positioned the argument like this:
“[a]ny payment to living donors . . . would ‘create a second-class citizenry’ of people
whose organs would be commodities and who would risk organ donation under the
coercion of need.”161 As this argument operates, no matter how honestly an organ
solicitor may profess that no undue influence occurred, and no matter how
“voluntarily” a destitute donor attests to have participated in the transaction, the
element of economic coercion will inevitably have pervaded the donor’s decision.162
By virtue of lacking money or assets, the poor will not be able to resist the
temptation to achieve some “quick money” for one of their organs.163 As a result,
not only would social stratification further polarize, but the general health of the
lower class would sharply decline, creating a “sub-class” of human beings.164
Should human body parts be alienable, as this argument dictates, an inescapable aura
of “economic coercion” would dictate the choices of the lower-class.165

155
Healy, supra note 132. The United Network for Organ Sharing, an administrative
organization set up by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, polices organ procurement and
distribution to those in priority of need. Id.
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See S. Gregory Boyd, Considering a Market in Human Organs, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
417, 461 (2003); see also Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation
of a Futures Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 20 (1994).
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Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 125, 128 (1983) (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.).
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This particular fear has factual support from horrific events involving innocent
people being murdered for their organs.166 After a large number of killings in
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, some authorities believed that those murders may have been
linked to an illegal organ trafficking ring between Mexico and the United States.167
Since 1993, nearly one hundred women had been killed in Ciudad Juarez, the city
directly across the border from El Paso, Texas.168 With several organs having been
removed from many of the victims’ bodies, authorities premised that an organ
trafficking ring may be either the impetus or the culprit itself behind the killings and
that the slayers then sold the organs in international black markets.169
Also, return to the plight of the poor Brazilian man in the Introduction of this
note.170 His story sad but true, Alberty Jose da Silva was solicited one day by an
Israeli “middleman” from an international “organ syndicate” to undergo a kidney
removal procedure in a hospital located in Durban, South Africa.171 The recipient of
da Silva’s kidney was an American woman from Brooklyn, New York, who was
dying of kidney failure.172 Both recipient and donor were flown to a hospital in
Durban, South Africa where they underwent the clandestine procedure, illegal under
the laws of the United States, Brazil, and South Africa.173 After the transplant
operation, da Silva contracted health problems from the haphazard operation and
from the loss of one of his kidneys.174 Other poor Brazilians who had sold a kidney
or liver through the same organ trafficking ring also faced criminal charges by
Brazilian authorities for their participation. One particularly unfortunate man was
robbed of the money that was paid in exchange for his kidney, thus left with so much
less than he had before his transplant operation.175
Although this particular “organ trafficking ring” was dissolved by international
authorities, the organization had facilitated over three hundred illegal organ
transplants in a Durban hospital since 2001.176 Supporters of the prohibition on
organ sales readily point to such appalling events internationally where some people
“sell their flesh to survive”177 and others are killed for their organs, and they posit
that lifting the ban would invite similar activity here in the United States.
166
See Mark Stevenson, Organ Theft Legend Resurfaces in Mexico Border Slayings,
SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, July 1, 2003, Vol. 27 at 7.
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prohibited by the government . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 988 (8th ed. 2004).
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Conversely, others attack the current legislation prohibiting organ sales as
paternalistic. Basically, advocates for donor compensation argue that any price for a
life-saving organ is preferable to death and that the current law wrongly takes away
that option.178 Proponents of changing the law to allow for commercial sales of
human organs cite the shortage of organs in contrast to their vast demand and argue
that the current system for organ procurement fails year after year to meet the
need.179 According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, for every
70 people who receive an organ transplant daily in the United States, another 16 die
due to the growing shortage of organs.180 Other statistics are just as startling. In
2004, more than 87,000 people in the United States were on waiting lists for
organs.181 Since 1993, that number has risen dramatically by 65,000, while the
number of donations has remained stagnant at approximately 18,000 organs per
year.182 Indeed, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, which
provides the only national organ patient waiting list, has reported that the list will
continue to grow.183
Furthermore, transplant surgeons have pleaded that mere education about organ
donation has no effect on the problem of supply shortage.184 As one transplant
surgeon put it, “[w]e’ve done all the education [about organ donation procedures] we
can do . . . [w]e’re not getting anywhere.185 Additionally, advocates of change argue,
correctly, that every other “link in the donative chain” of organs does receive
monetary compensation for its services and that this inequity vindicates a system of
payment to donors as well.186 Indeed, the UAGA and NOTA both allow “reasonable
payments” to organ procurement agencies, intermediaries who contact and obtain
donors, and other participants in the process of organ procurement for “removal,
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of
a human organ.”187 Organ donors, however, can receive no outright recompense for
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“A heart at $125,000 may be a bargain when the alternative is death.” CAPRON &
BIRNBAUM, supra note 53, at 17.
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Healy, supra note 132.
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U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, FirstGov: Organ Donation, at
http://www.organdonor.gov/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2005).
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The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, at http://www.optn.org/ (last
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7, 2005).
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Healy, supra note 132.
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42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (stating that “valuable consideration does not include the
reasonable payments associated with a transplant procedure itself”); see also OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2108.12(b) (“‘[v]aluable consideration’ does not include reasonable payments for the
removal, processing, disposal, preservation, quality control, storage, transportation, or
implantation of a part of a body”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f(c)(2) (“‘[v]aluable consideration’
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their organ under the current law.188 In sum, those in favor of compensation point
out the inequitable result that the only participants obtaining zero financial gain are
the sources of the organs themselves.189
Nevertheless, NOTA does exempt from prohibited “valuable consideration”
certain reimbursement expenses to the donor, including lost wages and travel and
housing costs incurred by the donation process.190 The Senate Committee that
produced the final version of NOTA assured donors that these expenses, though
limited in dollar amount by organ procurement agencies, would not go
uncompensated.191 Cognizant of the voiced concern that the prohibition against
organ sales “may inadvertently make it illegal to reimburse individuals for
reasonable costs incurred in the process of organ donation”, the Committee assured
that “[i]t is not [its] intent that any such reasonable costs be considered part of
valuable consideration.”192 NOTA even provides for federal grants to state
governments and organ procurement organizations in order to assure donors the
reimbursement of these “qualifying expenses.”193 Furthermore, in April 2004,
President George W. Bush signed into law a federal bill that allows reimbursement
costs to come directly from the organ recipient rather than simply from the federallyfunded organ procurement organizations.194
In addition, states have enacted legislation assuring reimbursement expenses to
organ donors.195 Just as within the federal scheme, such statutes compensate organ
donors for lost wages, any transportation costs, and lodging expenses incurred as
incident to the transplant procedure.196 However, states are additionally exploring
the benefit of special tax breaks to organ donors.197 For instance, Wisconsin recently
decided to allow statutory tax breaks in order to reimburse the “non-consideration”
expenses incident to organ donation procedures.198 The Wisconsin law, spurring into
motion similar bills in other states across the nation,199 allows a one-time tax
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deduction of up to $10,000 for organ donors.200 Still, the donors may only claim this
deduction for travel and lodging expenses and lost wages incurred as a result of an
organ donation procedure.201 Thus, the state statutes allowing tax breaks to organ
donors echo the federal assurance that the donors will receive reimbursement of
costs incident to the transplantation.
Thus, while it may be correct to say that organ donors receive no financial profit
for their organs, one must also acknowledge the fact that the prohibition on sale does
not leave donors “out in the cold” without any reimbursement for expenses sustained
through the transplant procedures.
Assuring to organ donors equitable
reimbursement of expenses incidental to transplant procedures hopefully will
encourage more people to donate their organs without lifting the prohibition against
commercial sale of human organs.
IV. CONTEMPORARY LAWS AND MARKET PRACTICES
REGARDING SALES OF GAMETES
The permission of monetary compensation to “donors”202 of gametes primarily
originates from statutory definitions of what does and does not constitute a human
organ for purposes of prohibiting sales. Several state statutes express that
regenerative cells are not organs and that the prohibition on purchase and sale does
not extend to these cells.203 NOTA, however, has no such explicit statement,
although its consistent interpretation has been to exempt sperm and eggs as not
within its definition of “human organ.”204 Note, however, the following open-ended
phrase in that section: “and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including
that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
by regulation.”205 This ostensibly could include reproductive cells, should the
Secretary of Health and Human Services pass a regulation so specifying. In any
case, human gametes are currently outside the scope of legal status as “organs” for
purposes of the prohibition on outright sale.206
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Consequently, as distinguishably regenerative parts of the human body, gametes
can be sold and purchased on the market as transferable and disposable personal
property. Indeed, sperm and ova have become market commodities, reaching bids
from prospective purchasers as high as $15,000 and $50,000, respectively.207 The
Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago has published that its current charge for a
complete egg donation cycle is $18,200, which includes “the donor’s fee of
$5,000.”208 Also, cryobanks such as the N.W. Andrology and Cryobank provide a
pricing list for semen specimens, ranging from $180 per vial for one vial received to
$165 per vial for 12 to 24 vials “purchased at the same time.”209 Thus, both
individual solicitors and the fertility clinics performing the extraction and
implantation procedures provide monetary compensation to donors for their gametes.
Just like any other fully market-alienable good, the demand is highest for
gametes with the greatest quality.210 In this context of sperm and ova donations, this
postulate of economics manifests itself in a common formula: wealthy individuals or
couples will pay top dollar to donors with the most “preferred” physical, intellectual,
and social traits with the hopes of maximizing athleticism, physical attractiveness,
and intelligence in their offspring. Within the market for such “high profile” sperm
and ova,211 the customer is always right, and solicitors have the unbridled discretion
to reject any potential donor not satisfying their advertised criteria.
To illustrate this market reality, consider the role that gender plays in the price
differential between sperm and ova. Normally, sperm are nearly limitless in supply
and more easily attainable than ova; and so, they have a lower demand in the
market.212 Typical prices for sperm donors can range from $45 for a single donation
“to $200 a week for weekly donations” for a six month duration ($4,800 for six
months).213 In contrast, ova are normally restricted in supply to only one per month
for each woman;214 even with today’s technology, the surgical extraction of female
ova still necessitates time-consuming and possibly painful surgical procedures.215
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Usually, only with drug-induced hyper-stimulation of the ovaries can more than one
egg be generated during a given menstrual cycle.216 And so, due to this inherent
supply-side limitation, ova demand a greater market value than sperm.
Consequently, private solicitation offers for ova have reached as high as a
“whopping” $50,000 for a single extraction procedure, while sperm prices have
reached nowhere near that amount.217 Acknowledging this price differential, one
cannot deny the consequently economic nature of human gametes as commodified
property that is fully salable in the market.
Other contemporary protocols provide further evidence of the market atmosphere
of human gametes. For example, the Internal Revenue Service requires donors of
ova to pay taxes on any money received from the donation process.218 It is also
common for paying recipients of gametes to account for the donor’s medical bills
from the procedure.219 These practices supplement the veracity of the averment that
a market in human gametes exists in the United States.
Advocates of reimbursement to donors of reproductive cells defend that such
compensation is merely for the donor’s time, trouble, and, in the case of ova, the
painful surgical procedure.220 The American Fertility Society has stated its official
position to view any commercial sale of human ova as wrong but to acknowledge
reimbursement for donors’ time and inconvenience as readily permissible.221
Likewise, sperm banks and egg procurement offices typically assert that donors are
merely being reimbursed for their time and trouble.222 However, attempting to
“disguise the economic reality of the sale,”223 assertions like these set up a
comforting but false palliative for gamete donors.
At any rate, only when a fertility clinic or egg procurement program makes the
payment to the donor could such assertions have any legitimacy.224 But where
private individuals have contacted donors through direct or indirect solicitation and
advertisement, the situation is vastly different. In these instances, any payment is
plausibly for the gametes themselves, with procedural costs merely a pretense.225
Regardless of the professed basis for the payment, remuneration to donors of sperm
and ova by their solicitors remains legal.226
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On the other hand, a comparative few have laid arguments against the sale of
human gametes. And those contentions that have been advanced mainly concern the
health implications for women involving the extraction procedures as well as the
moral and social issues possibly implicated with future offspring. As to the first
concern, very little data exists as to the hyper-ovulating drugs needed for the egg
extraction procedures.227 Understandably, therefore, some women fear for their
health due to the virtually unknown risks with the drugs they must take in order to
induce hyper-ovulation. As to the latter concern, only a few have argued that the
commodification of human gametes has the potential to threaten the sanctity of
human dignity.228 However, although neither of these arguments directly addresses
the problem of commercial sale, each requires same exploration.
V. ANALYSIS OF DISPARATE LEGAL TREATMENT
OF HUMAN “PARTS” AND “PRODUCTS”
Legal scholars and property theorists, as well as judges, have found it very
difficult to speak of human body parts without resorting to masking them in property
terminology. This is so on account of the dual problem of the human body not fitting
within the traditional doctrines of property law and judicial hesitance in stating that
the human body is property. Given that modern property law has come so far as to
recognize only limited autonomy over human body parts, the prohibition on
compensation to donors of organs should not be reconcilable with the contradictory
retailing of gametes. Otherwise, some portions of the human body are fully alienable
personal property, transferable and disposable at the will of their owners, while
others are inconsistently not alienable property.
Organs have been effectively deemed market-inalienable; while statutes not only
allow but encourage their removal from one body and transplant to another, organs
can receive no market value as tangible personal property. Without this marketinalienable status, the result would be that organs could never be transplanted for
those in need, frustrating the strong societal interest in preserving human life. On the
other hand, sperm and ova, have been granted market-alienable status and can
receive substantial market value, just like any parcel of tangible personal property.
Supporters of this distinguished treatment of gametes offer a simple argument: it is
not dangerous to the donor or to society in general to alienate regenerative tissue and
cells like sperm and ova, while it is extremely hazardous to one’s health and life to
do so with any non-regenerative body part, for example, a kidney or a liver.229
Additionally, there may be an intuitive difference between body “parts” (organs) and
body “products” (gametes and blood). However, these arguments fail for several
reasons.
First, the “blurry line drawn in the sand” between regenerative and nonregenerative body parts has arguably begun to disappear with unprecedented
advances in medical technology.230 Recently, surgeons have successfully completed
227
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procedures of “splitting” livers, which involves cutting a donated organ into two
halves.231 The doctors then place each half into two different donees, with the result
that the half-livers will regenerate into complete, fully functioning livers.232
Physicians have developed other novel methods for “stretching” the use of donated
organs.233 For instance, the procedure of “bridging,” endeavoring to “keep a patient
alive long enough to get a real [organ],” connects failing organs to functional ones.234
In addition, surgeons have also attempted “xenotransplantation,” entailing
implantation of organs from nonhuman species into humans.235 Although these
methods have often been assailed as risky,236 they arguably evidence a current
medical trend towards accepting the prohibition on organ sales and attempting novel
ways to address the organ shortage. Furthermore, obvious ethical issues aside, the
advent of stem cell research may allow physicians to literally grow new organs from
stem cells.237 Thus, gametes should no longer be distinguishable from statutorily
defined “organs” on the sole basis of status as regenerative or non-regenerative.238
Second, unlike the relative simplicity of sperm donation, the egg harvesting
procedure is extremely lengthy, invasive, and risky for a woman’s health.239 The
process of egg extraction involves hyper-stimulation of the ovaries in order to
produce a large amount of eggs per cycle, rather than just one.240 Ovarian hyperstimulation can produce serious health risks for women, including ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome.241 Although less common than simple aches and pains as side
effects of hyper-stimulation and surgical removal of ova, this retention of fluid by
the ovaries could present a possibly life-threatening condition for a woman.242 Far
more serious, albeit less frequent, side-effects risked by egg donation procedures
include infertility and ovarian cancer.243 Therefore, health risks permeate both ends
of the spectrum of human body parts, and any argument that organ donation
definitively presents more serious health risks can be misleading.
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Third, compensation to donors of sperm and ova exploits the participants for their
gametes while presenting dangers to society. College newspaper advertisements and
egg brokerage firms “capitaliz[e] on the human desire for a child while
simultaneously exploiting young women and undervaluing their social worth as
individuals.”244 As the Senate Committee for NOTA stated, “individual pleas
through television and newspaper articles . . . may be counterproductive to the needs
of many others requiring organ transplantation.”245 Moreover, private solicitors of
“high profile” gametes sometimes promise vast sums of money merely to attract as
many applicants as possible to the pool.246 Quite often, according to the New York
Advisory Group on Assisted Reproductive Technologies, the advertiser does not
intend to pay much at all.247 And so, open solicitation for any human body part,
gamete and organ alike, may unfairly deprive others just as deserving or needy from
equal access to organs and gametes.
Just as importantly, donors of ova and sperm may be left legally unprotected by
law should they seek to assert any rights over their gametes.248 Egg procurement
agencies routinely inform donors that they “have no control over what happens” to
their gametes once they donate their cells.249 This fact spawns a myriad of other
issues, such as whether a biological mother – the donor of the egg – could
conceivably condition her donation on visitation rights with her biological child
throughout its life. While the conviction of some donors may hold that visitation or
even custody rights over the offspring conceived from their gametes cannot be
denied them should they legally pursue vindication of such rights,250 in general,
courts have met the enforceability of agreements or contracts like these with little
welcome.
In the analogous situation of surrogacy contracts, several courts have held such
contracts void as contrary to the strong public policy that a mother should have time
after her child’s birth to reflect on her wishes concerning the child.251 In one case in
particular, the court held that a surrogacy contract should be given no legal effect
where the mother’s agreement was obtained prior to a reasonable time after the
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child’s birth or where “the agreement was induced by the payment of money.”252
Thus, for similar reasons, payment to egg donors for their ova may void any contract
for visitation rights or custody that the donor seeks to enter into with the donee prior
to the surgical extraction. The same will likely hold true for donors of sperm who
wish to assert paternal rights over the offspring from their sperm. Permitting full
property status to sperm and ova by allowing outright sale on the market has opened
the door for these risks.
Returning to Professor Radin’s personhood model for justifying property rights, I
propose a system of full and equal market-inalienability for all human body parts –
organs and gametes. A “gifts only” regime will best protect the interests of donors
involved and at the same time preserve altruistic donation.253 As Radin suggests,
once an object receives market value, altruism is forever undermined, and every
subsequent transfer of that object faces risk of being drowned in market
terminology.254
Radin’s slippery slope argument of market commodities has a further implication
for gamete donation. She posits that,
[i]f we permit babies to be sold, we commodify not only the mother’s
(and father’s) baby-making capacities – which might be analogous to
commodifying sexuality – but we also conceive of the baby in market
rhetoric. When a baby becomes a commodity, all of its personal attributes
– sex, eye color, predicted I.Q., predicted height, and the like – become
commodified as well.”255
Not only could babies as human persons face the danger of becoming market
commodities, but potentially all human, personal traits will also suffer the
classification of market goods.256 This is the very reason why, in this context, there
lies no difference – logical or semantic – between body “parts” and body “products.
Thus, websites and college newspaper ads that solicit donors with “preferred”
traits arguably foster an ominous 21st century culture of eugenics, in which people
not only “shop” for their babies but also for the perfect characteristics and attributes
of their offspring. Flatly, the permitted compensation for human gametes, to borrow
again from Mill, “has made property of things which never ought to be property, and
absolute property where only a qualified property ought to exist.”257 The market
reality of sales in human gametes must end, as the monetization of human
reproductive capacity in this way promotes a looming attitude that all human
attributes are equally commodifiable.
As possible solutions for achieving market-inalienability of gametes, consider the
following situation where both organs and reproductive cells have been equally
denied monetary compensation. EBay, Inc. is an Internet company operating under
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the website eBay.com by which users may purchase and sell items of virtually
limitless variety in a unique auction format.258 In general, the online auction site
states in its guidelines that “the human body or any human body parts may not be
listed on eBay.”259 Specifically, eBay prohibits auctions featuring sperm and ova for
sale in addition to those featuring organs for sale.260 This provides an example of a
private industry pronouncing that both organs and gametes are not suitable for sale in
its market.
However, private declarations like eBay’s prohibition still do not have the full
force of law. A possible legal solution would be to utilize an avenue available and
present in the National Organ Transplant Act since its inception. In defining “human
organ,” NOTA includes the phrase “and any other human organ (or any subpart
thereof, including that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services by regulation.”261 The Secretary could simply regulate that human
gametes be included in the ban against monetary purchase as subparts of human
organs. Gametes would no longer be market commodities, but the system would still
allow donors to be reimbursed for incidental expenses and costs, just as it permits
with organ donations.
In addition, the United States could follow the lead of other countries that have
prohibited the sale of gametes. In early 2004, the Italian Parliament passed a bill
banning, among other forms of assisted reproduction, egg donation and artificial
insemination using donated sperm.262 This bill, passed into law by Italy’s President
on February 19, 2004, reportedly grew out of loud dissent from the vicinage of the
Roman Catholic Church against “monstrous and sacrilegious” experiments with
frozen embryos that were conceived from donated gametes.263 Canada has also
banned monetary compensation to donors of reproductive cells, “due to the
arguments concerning exploiting women for their reproductive capabilities and . . .
doctors playing God.”264 The United States should take this lead from other
industrialized countries and ban the outright sale of human gametes.
Pursuing the other route that some have suggested, to “start acknowledging that
people’s body parts are their personal property,” would set dangerous precedent.265
This attitude often manifests itself in the phrase, disturbingly ubiquitous in 21st
century culture, “it’s my body; I can do with it what I want.” While some may cite
to ambiguous and, quite frankly, tenuous notions of fundamental liberty in
supporting such an assertion, the ultimate question remains as to whether property
258
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law has ever recognized or is prepared to recognize a market-alienable right to
financial compensation for bartering with one’s body. Moreover, as stated in Part II
above, the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently refused to
acknowledge the existence of such an unlimited right.266
One need only look toward the terrible exploitation of poor individuals abroad to
harness truly the dangerous potential of declaring human body parts property.267 As
Professor Radin feared, once some aspects of the human body become commodified,
all human attributes may face the peril of suffering a similar fate.268 Furthermore,
several states have commenced granting donors of organs more than adequate
reimbursement for their expenses incurred, including some which have offered
generous tax breaks in order to encourage more donations.269 Donors of gametes
already receive similar reimbursement expenses. In sum, since the law appropriately
prohibits compensation to donors of organs for strong reasons of public policy, it
should also deny compensation to donors of gametes.
VI. CONCLUSION
A fascinating and seemingly endless legal dispute has gone on for centuries
regarding whether the human body and its components are the personal property of
each person. This much is certain: if the human body is not property, then it may not
be subject to sale. But even if the human body could be classified as some sui
generis form of property, the debate subsists upon the issue of whether body parts
should receive monetary value in the market. This note has proposed that the human
body must achieve full and equal market-inalienability throughout for the
preservation and respect of human personhood.
Notwithstanding a disputable modern trend towards recognizing property
interests in human body parts, legislatures and courts have still limited these rights,
however they may be categorized, by balancing them with strong public policies. In
order to align these policies more properly with fundamental tenets of property law,
the prohibition against sale and purchase of human organs must harmonize with a
similar prohibition on compensation for human gametes.
As the current system in the United States prohibits the sale of organs but permits
commercial sale of human gametes, the latter must adjust in order to achieve
complete market-inalienability of the human body. Only then will “put[ting] a price
on human life” be truly impossible.270
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